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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
The restrictions against picketing the ultimate consumer and
picketing the retailer in order to encourage the public to withdraw
totally its patronage from him seem reasonable. The policy
behind them is the same declared by the Texas court in the
Ritter's Cafe case, supra, viz., that the picketing should be confined
to those industrially related to the primary employer and un-
mistakably show that the dispute is with the latter. The public
interest in the free flow of commerce is at stake. It will be remem-
bered that a prime requirement in the ambulatory employer
picketing cases is also that the placards show with whom the real
dispute is.
In summary, the criterion is not so much can the secondary
employer do something which will influence the primary employer
favorably for the union, as will the court allow picketing to occur
before the secondary employer's premises when he is relatively
remote from the dispute, although not a neutral of purest ray.
Perhaps in the principal case picketing of the service station which
dealt only briefly and occasionally with the primary employer
should not have been tolerated while the men working on the
sign were absent. Two recent cases are indicative of a trend to
forbid product picketing altogether. Way Baking Co. v. Teamsters
& Truck Drivers Local No. 164, 335 Mich. 478, 56 N.W.2d 357
(1953); Capital Service v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 848 (1953).
R. L. D.
LABOR LAW - COLLECTiVE BARGAINING - RENT ON COMPANY-
OWNED HousEs.-Employer announced a rent increase on all of
its dwellings leased to employees. Employees protested this uni-
lateral action, deeming it to be a "pay cut", and stated that the
matter of house rent must be taken up with the union as a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining. The NLRB in Lehigh
Portland Cement Co., 101 NLRB No. 110 (Nov. 24, 1952), upheld
employees' contention. [Apparently, in Bemis Bro. Bag Co., 96
NLRB 728 (1951), the Board opined rent to be ipso facto a man-
datory subject of collective bargaining.] Held, on review, that
the employer must bargain collectively on the proposed rent in-
crease by virtue of §§ 8 (d), 9 (a) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1946), as amended by
Labor Management Relations Act 1947, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29
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U.S.C. § 141 (Supp. 1951). NLRB v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co.,
205 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1953); accord, NLRB v. Hart Cotton Mills,
190 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1951). But cf. NLRB v. Bemis Bro. Bag Co.,
206 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1953).
The facts of the Lehigh and Bemis cases distinguish the deci-
sions. The conclusions of law in both instances were based solely
upon the answers to these inquiries: (1) Is rent on the dwellings
below the prevailing rates on comparable housing in the area?
(2) Is there a shortage of housing facilities in the community? The
Lehigh case, which held the subject to be one for mandatory col-
lective bargaining, had affirmative answers to both questions; in
the Bemis case both were answered negatively. It was said in the
latter case that the holding would have been different had a hous-
ing shortage and low-rental rate on the company-owned houses
been found. The consequences to the employees of affirmative
findings to the above two queries were stated by each court to be
within the meaning of "wages" (as to question 1) and "conditions
of employment" (as to question 2) as used in the statute.
The Act states that the employer must bargain collectively with
his employees with respect to "rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment, and other conditions of employment." The Act, however,
does not define the terms.
When the original act was enacted management contended
that Congress did not intend to expand the area of collective bar-
gaining beyond those matters which were historically the subjects
of collective bargaining. The courts have rejected this contention
on the basis that the legislative intent was to provide for collective
bargaining on the increasing problems arising from the employer-
employee relationship. W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875
(1st Cir. 1949); see Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1909).
The courts have avoided giving broad definitions of the terms
"wages" and "conditions of employment," merely deciding that a
matter is within or beyond the legislative intent. Note, 50 COL.
L. R.v. 351 (1950). However, the court in W. W. Cross v. NLRB,
supra at 878, though expressly stating that it did not attempt to
mark the outer boundaries of its meaning, said that the term
"wages" embraced within its meaning direct and immediate
economic benefits flowing from the employment relationship. The
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view of the NLRB that "wages" include "emoluments of value...
which may accrue to employees out of their employment relation-
ship" was thus adopted. See Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, supra at
251. In unrelated fields the term "wages" has been defined
similarly, as in § 2 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1946),
it is stated to include "reasonable value of board, rent, housing,
lodging, or similar advantages received from the employer." Thus,
"left-overs" customarily eaten by the employees was said to be
within this definition. Harris v. Lambros, 56 F.2d 488 (D.C. Cir.
1932). In the Social Security Act, 49 STAT. 642 (1935), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1011 (1946), taxable "wages" embrace "all remuneration."
Among the matters held to be within the scope of "wages"
and "conditions of employment" by the appellate courts and the
NLRB are: group health and insurance plans (insurance "at a
much less cost that such could be obtained through contracts of
insurance negotiated individually"), W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB,
174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949); prices of meals furnished by employer
at logging camp where employees had no public or employer-
furnished means of transportation to public eating facilities,
Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 NLRB 672 (1949); individual merit
increases, NLRB v. J. H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.
1948); pension and retirement plans, Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB,
170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948). In each of the above instances the
program was instituted unilaterally by the company and collective
bargaining was held compulsory with respect to some modification
thereof which management or the union proposed.
It was the court's view in both the Bemis and Lehigh cases
that where rent on company-owned houses had been uniformly low
it is a partial compensation, an emolument of value and thus
within the meaning of "wages." Also, the courts took the position
that if adequate private housing is not available in the plant
community and because of this circumstance the employee must
rent a company house then the terms and conditions of occupancy
can well be said to be a "condition of employment."
It is questionable whether the principal cases have extended
the outer bounds of matters held to be within the scope of manda-
tory collective bargaining. Does rent of company-owned houses
show less clearly a pertinency to be employment relationship than
pension and retirement plans and group health and insurance
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plans which have represented the extremity of issues concerning
which management must bargain? It does involve an additional
relationship between an employer and his employees, namely, land-
lord-tenant.
Though it may be said that this subject stands on the extremity
of mandatory fringe issues to be bargained, have not the two
courts been unduly restrictive in saying that only when rentals
have been lower than the community average do such become a
matter to be bargained within the meaning of "wages?" Is this
a fair test; rather, does it not discriminate against the employer
who has unilaterally granted a "value" to his employees-as in the
Lehigh case, a lower than average rent over a period of years? And
does it not mean that once an employer grants an "emolument of
value" to his employees, henceforth any proposed variation thereof
becomes a subject to be bargained; whereas, the employees are
denied the benefits of compulsory collective bargaining to secure
an "emolument."
Hours of work are not to be bargained only when management
proposes an increase nor rates of pay only when about to be
decreased. They are also to be bargained when the employees seek
to modify them so as to increase their benefits. By the same token
should it not be mandatory that management bargain collectively
with its employees when the latter propose to make rentals on
company-owned houses an emolument of value by a decrease in
rent payments? Should it not likewise be mandatory that the
employer bargain when the employees propose to inaugurate a
"wage" as when the employer grants a wage and then seeks to vary
it? If this reasoning be adopted, then the matters about which
management must bargain will be greatly expanded, for example,
prices of goods sold in company-owned stores.
C. R. M.
LEGISLATION-SEPARABILITY CLAUSES IN STATUTES-CUMULATIVE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ITEMS IN APPROPRIATIONS AcTs.-In an original
proceeding in mandamus brought by the state board of school
finance to require the state auditor to honor a requisition pertain-
ing to state aid for schools, the auditor's answer challenged the
constitutionality of the budget act as passed by the legislature
during the regular session of 1953. The Supreme Court of Appeals
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [1954], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol56/iss1/10
